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The Region and Taxation: School Finance,
Cities, and the Hope for Regional Reform
MYRON ORFIELDt
INTRODUCTION
Americans today are governed by a panoply of local
governments, especially those who live in metropolitan
communities.' Political power is legally divided among tens
of thousands of local governments, 2 from general purpose
governments like cities and counties to special
governments, like school districts and water districts. Each
government is financed by a constantly changing mix of
local, state, and federal funds, and each citizen subject to a
shifting mix of taxes and user fees. 3 Given this complexity,
it is not surprising that almost no citizen is aware of all of
these levels of government or of how their taxes finance
these governments, much less how all these governments
affect each other for good or ill.
This fragmented landscape is largely the result of the
legal and cultural solicitude given cities, particularly in
making land use decisions, and an ad hoc system of problem
solving by the creation of new levels and forms of
government. Although cities and townships derive their
power from the state, such localities generally enjoy the
legal right to make policy without considering the
t Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Institute on Race & Poverty,
University of Minnesota Law School, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, the
Brookings Institution.
1. The United States Census defines a "metropolitan area" as a single
employment and housing market. DAVID Y. MILLER, THE REGIONAL GOVERNING
OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 51-53 (2002) (citing The Federal Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, OMB Bull. 99-04).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part I.A.
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repercussions on the region as a whole. 4 Whether they
realize it or not, city officials compete with each other,
seeking tax wealth and social status in the form of
businesses and high-income white individuals. 5 While some
economists and legal scholars view some parts of this
competition as positive and productive,6 the balance of
scholarly opinion sees the totality of it as increasingly
problematic and detrimental to the region. 7 The effects of
competition harm all citizens of a region, city and suburban,
rich and poor, racial minorities and white people.8 It affects
the regional workforce, the strength of regional economies,
and the quality of the environment in many of overlapping
respects. 9
In the last generations, a small group of scholars, the
"new regionalists," has focused on the dimensions and
implications of city/suburban competition, particularly the
problems it creates. 10 New regionalists advocate measures
to reduce growing inequality, discourage the detrimental
fiscal competition between local governments within a
metropolitan region, and remove fiscal barriers to
cooperative land use planning. Given the pervasiveness of
localism, however, most scholars and activists who believe
in regional reform are pessimistic about the prospects for
reform.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See NEAL R. PIERCE ET AL., CITISTATES (1993).
10. Among the best known works engaging with new regionalism are
ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1994); GERALD
FRUG, CITY MAKING (1999); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV 1 (1990) [hereinafter
Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1]; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-
Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV 346 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault,
Our Localism: Part II]; Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the
Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism,
88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geographies in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994); Laurie
Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation: Metropolitan Equity, and the New
Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93 (2003).
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
This Article argues that there has been a steady,
largely positive equalization in the funding of a major
player in local government, the school district. After briefly
discussing the problem of competition and the claims of new
regionalists," this Article will track the development of
school finance reform, including the recent success of
plaintiffs in asserting claims seeking adequacy in
education, rather than simply equity in funding. 12 It will
show that school districts' traditional reliance on local
property taxes has been effectively lessened by state
equalization.13 This Article will examine two states where
significant changes in school equity occurred in the 1990s:
Kentucky and Michigan. Both, moving from approximately
twenty to eighty [check on this] percent state funding, saw
dramatic drops in their reliance on local taxes and a rise in
fiscal equalization, but in very different ways. In Kentucky,
litigation and public education brought about change in
what was arguably one the worst school systems in the
United States.' 4 In Michigan, discontent over high taxes
caused the state legislature to first sever property taxes
from its predominante role in funding schools, and then
later give Michigan voters a choice of how to fund them. 15
The Article will note lessons regionalists can learn from
each case and from school finance reform largely. It will
note that the most sweeping equitable result occurred in
Kentucky where there was powerful, well planned
litigation, significant investment in public education, and a
coherent majority-based legislative strategy. However,
while making school financing more equitable, particularly
in the eyes of the particular plaintiffs who brought the case,
this reform often did not have sufficient remedial effect on
the inter-city competition for high income homeowners and
businesses to break the dynamic of growing spatial and
fiscal inequality. This Article will conclude by noting that
some form of litigation strategy together with public
education and organizing could advance the possibility of
regional reform in other areas, such as municipal finance,
11. See infra Parts I, II.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See infra Part IV.A.3.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
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regional land use and/or governance issues. Finally, the
Article will argue that the collaboration necessary to build a
school and municipal equity coalition can also be used to
build a coalition on land use planning and regional
governance.
I. THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL FRAGMENTATION
A. Horizontal Fragmentation
State and local government are huge operations,
rivaling and sometimes surpassing the federal government
in total size and spending. In 2002, the federal government
had nearly 2.7 million civilian employees, state
governments had over 5 million and local government had
over 13 million. 16 While the federal budget in 2003 spent
$2.13 trillion, 17 the combined expenditure of state and local
government was $2.16 trillion and local government over $1
trillion.18 Although each governmental unit generates much
of its own revenue, state and local governments depend on
other governmental sources for significant streams of
revenue, state governments from federal transfers and local
governments from state transfers.19
Many urban and suburban problems arise from
competition between local entities in gaining access to these
sources of revenue. Local government in the United States
comes in several forms, most prominently cities, special
districts (including school districts), counties, and
metropolitan planning organizations. All are creatures of
the state, generally alterable at will by the state, but all are
dependent on state revenue collected from outside their
borders for operation. About one fifth of city, one third of
16. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS GC02(3)-2,
COMPENDIUM OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: 2002 NATIONAL SUMMARY 1 tbl.1 (2002).
17. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, 395 tbl.S-1 (2002).
18. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES BY LEVEL
OF GOVERNMENT: 2002-2003 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/
estimate/03s/00us.html.
19. Id. (thirty percent of state general revenue comes from the federal
government as aid while forty percent of local government revenue comes from
state aid).
2007] SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 95
county, half of the public school system, and seven percent
of special district budgets come from state aid.20 Competing
for state and federal aid, as well as local tax revenue and
private investment are tens of thousands of local
governments. In 2002, there were over 15,000 school
districts, 35,000 other special districts, about 3,000
counties, and nearly 36,000 cities or towns in the United
States. 21 Although each type of local government seeks
revenue from whatever sources it can obtain, the city lies at
the heart of local competition.
The decisions of cities regarding land use and taxation
are responsible for much of the inequity in regions in the
United States today. 22 Although city revenue is also drawn
from sales and income taxes, the majority of local revenue
is obtained from property taxes.23 Cities seek to maximize
their tax bases through fiscal zoning, land use decisions
which encourage high revenue properties over low revenue
properties. Within a state property tax system, for instance,
office parks provide greater revenues and require fewer
services than other forms of commercial or industrial
property, which as a group provide more revenue and less
services than most homes. 24 Similarly, expensive homes
provide more revenue and require fewer services than
modest homes or family rental housing.25 These decisions
have a profound effect on where individuals in a region can
live and, correspondingly, their access to services and jobs. 26
Fiscal competition, interacting with persistent, illegal (but
20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS GC02(4)-4,
FINANCES OF MUNICIPAL AND TOWNSHIP GOVERNMENTS: 2002 SUMMARY 1 tbl.1
(2005); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS GC02(4)-3,
FINANCES OF COUNTY GOVERNMENTS: 2002 SUMMARY 1 tbl.1 (2005); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS GC02(4)-2, FINANCES OF SPECIAL
DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS: 2002 SUMMARY I tbl.1 (2005); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS GC02(4)-1, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES: 2002
SUMMARY FINANCES 1 tbl.1 (2004).
21. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS GC02(1)-1,
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 3 tbl.3 (2002).
22. See MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS 96 (2002). Counties also
make land use decisions over unincorporated areas.
23. See id. at 88-89.
24. See id. at 90.
25. See id. at 88-90.
26. See id. at 91.
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unredressed) housing discrimination on the basis of race
and class, has had devastating consequences in terms of the
safety, health, and opportunity structures of persons of
color, particularly the poor.27 Competition also creates a
vicious cycle, whereby municipalities that have lost high
revenue property must either increase tax rates or reduce
services, either of which will reduce the locality's ability to
compete in the future.28
B. Vertical Competition
Each type of local government creates or minimizes the
inequities of fiscal competition in different ways, largely
based on the unique history and structure of each. Differing
scopes of governance, levels of accountability, and
relationships to other local jurisdictions, all factor into the
effect a local government type has on equity.
1. Cities. Cities are the most fundamental local
government actors in a region. 29 As discussed above, cities
are the primary decision makers in terms of land use and
hence the shaping of metropolitan society. The power of the
cities to plan land use derives from the state through its
delegation of the zoning power. 30 This power is limited by
statutory and constitutional requirements that land use
must promote health, safety, or the general welfare. 31 This
power has in practice given most cities basic sovereignty
27. See, e.g., PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE (1997); DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993); DAVID RUSK, CITIES
WITHOUT SUBURBS 27-31 (1994); Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and
Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (2005).
28. See ORFIELD, supra note 22, at 92.
29. "Cities," for purposes of this Article, include municipalities with land-
use planning powers, such as villages, townships, boroughs, towns, and urban
counties that control land use powers for unincorporated areas. Township
governments may or may not be active in shaping land in an area which is
otherwise incorporated or where the land use planning powers are undertaken
by the counties.
30. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 3.5, at 47-48, § 5.3, at 157-59
(2003).
31. See id. § 3.6 at 48-49 (discussing widely adopted Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act); see also id. § 10.12 at 442-43, § 10.12.D at 448-49 (discussing
traditional and modern requirements of substantive due process).
[Vol. 55
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over local land use decisions.3 2 While almost all cities have
elected local governments (and if elected must be
apportioned one person, one vote), there may be no
constitutional right to an elected local government.33
The early development of local government in the
United States led largely to metropolitan municipal
governments. The large cities of the country grew primarily
during most of the nineteenth century by the annexation
and consolidation of adjacent areas.3 4 Annexation was
attractive to people living near cities because cities
provided infrastructure that they would not otherwise be
able to afford, including sewer and water services and
roads.3 5 In most of the early years of annexation, however,
the acquiescence of people living in areas to be annexed was
not required-decisions regarding annexation were made at
the state, rather than the local level.3 6 The establishment of
independent cities or towns was also discouraged by laws
which treated municipal incorporation as a privilege to be
granted by state government. 37
Demographic and legal change during the nineteenth
century largely halted the trend toward metropolitan
government. The arrival of poor Eastern European
immigrants and African-American migrants in cities led
many suburbanites to fight efforts at annexation.38 State
law soon shifted away from allowing forcible annexation
toward requiring local referenda.3 9 In addition, state
legislatures made it easier to incorporate a new municipal
unit on the edge of a great city. With such incorporation,
the majority of local residents could effectively reject
annexation. 40 Now groups of citizens at the edge of a great
32. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 10, at 39-41.
33. See 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw § 9.02 (2003).
34. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 138-43 (1985).
35. See id. at 146-47.
36. See id. at 147-48.
37. See JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB 6 (1979).
38. See JACKSON, supra note 34, at 150-5 1.
39. See id. at 152.
40. See id.
20071
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city can often simply decide they want to become a new
municipality if the majority of residents agree. 41
The difficulty of annexation and ease of incorporation
reflect a legislative and judicial deference to local
communities that runs throughout American law. Although
traditionally cities have been viewed as creatures of the
state, postwar courts allowed local communities to act with
only the interests of their own residents in mind.42 This is
reflected in the destructive fiscal zoning discussed in the
previous section.
2. School Districts. School districts are the second most
powerful actors at the local level. Although they were
initially associated with cities and towns, 43 school districts
evolved into entities separate from municipalities. 44
Inequalities in funding between school districts have long
been a problem. Schools were initially funded through a
variety of sources, including rate bills (a tax on parents for
tuition), local taxes, and licensing and lotteries. 45 Although
most states had begun to directly support schools by the
mid-nineteenth century,46 until well into the twentieth
century, public education was mainly financed by local
taxes.4 7 A scholar of school finance noted in 1906 the
inequality produced by reliance on the local tax base:
While the towns or counties having the lowest rate of taxation
would have no difficulty in maintaining good schools taught by
good teachers for nine in ten months of the year ... the towns or
counties having the highest rate of taxation could maintain, with
41. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 10 at 74-75.
42. See id. at 39-40.
43. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION 153 (1980) (noting the
primary role of towns in establishing early schools, with districts assuming a
"surrogate" role).
44. See NEWTON EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 93-94 (3d
ed. 1971).
45. FLETCHER HARPER SWIFr, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC PERMANENT COMMON
SCHOOL FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1795-1905 at 23-38 (1911); see also JOHN
E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 47-48 (1970).
46. See LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL 126 (1951).
47. See PERCY E. BURRUP ET AL., FINANCING EDUCATION IN A CLIMATE OF
CHANGE 79 (6th ed. 1996).
[Vol. 55
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difficulty, only poor schools, taught by cheap teachers, for the legal
minimum term .... 48
Throughout the twentieth century, the share of school
financing supplied by local taxes has steadily, if slowly,
decreased. 49 The result, however, was not equal spending
per student across districts. Following the Second World
War there was a rapid growth in state finance that allowed
many suburban districts composed largely of homes as their
tax base, to finance and build separate suburban school
districts that would never have been otherwise able to exist
and support themselves as separate entities. The Kerner
report, issued following the riots of the later 1960s and just
before the first wave of school finance litigation, noted that
state contributions have not had an equalzing effect on city
schools.50
Political fragmentation further harmed, and continues
to harm, the ability of school districts to offer equal
opportunities. Cities in the suburbs frequently zone
subdivisions that make sense in terms of their fiscal needs,
but they often do not understand or even care about the
implications of their decisions on school districts. For
instance, a municipality might see starter homes as a rapid
revenue source, while school districts do not have sufficient
local tax support to educate the children from those
homes. 51
Unlike other special districts discussed below, if school
districts are elected and taxed, they must be apportioned
one person, one vote.52
48. ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, SCHOOL FUNDS AND THEIR APPORTIONMENT 54
(AMS Press, Inc. 1972) (1906).
49. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS
TABLES AND FIGURES, 2003 at 191 tbl.156, available at http:/! nces.ed.gov!
programs/digest/d03/tables/dt156.asp.
50. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968).
51. This happens often in bedroom-developing suburbs, where lack of
commercial tax base undermines all services, including schools. See ORFIELD,
supra note 22, at 2-3.
52. See MARTINEZ, supra note 33, § 2.17.
2007]
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3. Other Special Districts. Special districts, which have
power over only a specific area of governance, are the most
common form of local government and the fastest growing.5 3
Special districts span the spectrum of areas of governance.
Mid-nineteenth century districts served cities and their
suburbs in areas including law enforcement, sanitation, and
parks. 54 Another wave of districts was formed to circumvent
state-imposed limits on debt and taxation; because special
districts were separate units of local government, they were
formally not subject to these state municipality limits. 55 By
the middle of the twentieth century, special governments
had authority over housing and an array of other areas:
"law enforcement, health, planning, air quality control,
resource conservation, economic development, airports,
transit, and sewers."56  Special districts are funded
primarily through property taxes, service charges, and
fees.57
4. Counties. While cities were often the earliest form of
local government in the northern United States, counties
were the primary unit of local government in the early
south. 58 The power of counties has been limited by region
and by whether the county was urban or rural.
Traditionally, especially in rural areas, counties maintained
records, administered courts, and built roads.59 Early
counties had control over land use and continue to hold this
power today in areas where they have not been superseded
53. See KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE
GOVERNMENT 2 (1997). But see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION, supra note 21, at 4-6 (showing, between 1952 and 2002, no
measurable change in the number of county governments, less than six percent
growth in subcounty (city and town) general government, nearly eighty percent
fewer in school districts, and special districts nearly tripling).
54. See FOSTER, supra note 53, at 15-16.
55. See id. at 17; see also TEAFORD, supra note 37, at 6.
56. FOSTER, supra note 53, at 18-20.
57. See id. at 14.
58. See HERBERT SYDNEY DUNCOMBE, MODERN COUNTY GOVERNMENT 21-22
(1977); Lawrence L. Martin, American County Government: A Historical
Perspective, in COUNTY GOVERNMENTS IN AN ERA OF CHANGE 1, 3-4 (David R.
Berman ed., 1993).
59. MARTINEZ, supra note 33, § 1.5; DUNCOMBE, supra note 58, at 22.
100 [Vol. 55
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by cities. 60 Counties now provide a greater variety of
services, including hospitals, libraries, and parks, as well as
administering social welfare programs. 61  Regional
differences still characterize the variety of services
provided, with counties in New England providing fewer
services than in other areas of the country.62 Counties are
still very powerful in the South. 63
Because counties often span many municipalities and
communities of differing incomes, taxing and spending by
counties can both promote and inhibit equity.64
Sometimes the assumption of social services by a
county, particularly if it has a larger per capita tax base
than a city in its borders, can redistribute wealth from
affluent suburbs to less affluent cities. 65 This is true where
wealthy suburbs exist in the same jurisdiction as the city.
Often, however, a county tax rate applies to all residents
equally, while services are primarily provided to people
living in unincorporated, usually suburban, areas. 66 In
addition, some county functions, like road building, by their
nature distribute city tax dollars outward.67
5. Metropolitan Planning Organizations. Metropolitan
planning organizations (MPOs) are required by the federal
government to allocate highway money within a region. 68
Their members are most frequently appointed from among
other local government officials, by a state by state set of
60. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 30, § 3.5.
61. See DAVID K. HAMILTON, GOVERNING METROPOLITAN AREAS 262-66, 270
(1999).
62. Id. at 256.
63. See generally MARTINEZ, supra note 33, § 2.13
64. See HAMILTON, supra note 61, at 267.
65. See id. at 267-68 (discussing Brett W. Hawkins & Rebecca M. Hendrick,
Do County Governments Reinforce City-Suburban Inequalities?, 75 Soc. ScI. Q.
755 (1994)).
66. See HAMILTON, supra note 61, at 267.
67. See id.
68. See 23 U.S.C. § 134(b)(1) (2000) (requiring creation of MPO for urban
areas that exceed 50,000 individuals).
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formulae. 69 While MPOs are vested with the power to
formulate regional plans, state departments of
transportation have, in practice if not law, the final
authority as to which projects will go forward. 70 The
discretion given states arguably cuts against regionalist
ideals. 71 Although a previous statute ensured that MPOs
consider land use in their decisions, a recent amendment
removed that language. 72 Nonetheless, MPOs are the most
promising form of local government for thinking about
inter-regional problems.
II. NEW REGIONALISM: GOALS AND (FEW) HOPES
The problems of fragmentation and competition idicate
the need for a regional solution. Growing groups of
academics, politicians, and other thinkers are contributing
to a body of scholarship analyzing the problems of
metropolitan areas today and proposing solutions. Although
there is considerable debate within this loose movement,
these new regionalists share some consensus about what
needs to be done to counteract competition and end
inequity. They also share a common pessimism about the
possibility for reform.
A. The New Regionalist Consensus on Metropolitan Reform
For over a century, the field of local government law
has focused mainly on construing city and suburban
questions in terms of municipal legal doctrines formulated
in the nineteenth century. In the last generation, however,
a small group of scholars, "the new regionalists" have
69. Martin Wachs & Jennifer Dill, Regionalism in Transportation and Air
Quality: History, Interpretation, and Insights for Regional Governance, in
GOVERNANCE AND OPPORTUNITY IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 296, 303 (Alan
Altshuler et al. eds., 1999) (noting that local legislators comprise the
membership of most, but not all, MPO boards).
70. Benjamin K. Olson, Comment, The Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century: The Failure of Metropolitan Planning Organizations to Reform
Federal Transportation Policy in Metropolitan Areas, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 147, 159-
60 (2000).
71. See id. at 169-72.
72. See id. at 171. Compare 23 U.S.C. § 134(f) (1998) with 23 U.S.C. § 134(f)
(2005).
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focused on the dimensions and implications of
city/suburban competition and the problems caused
thereby. 73 Within this scholarship is a growing consensus
calling for doctrinal reform in three broad areas of the
city/suburban relationship. The first area is local
government finance, with the goal being to reduce
inequality, discourage the detrimental fiscal competition
between local governments within a metropolitan region,
and remove fiscal barriers to cooperative land use planning.
Implied in this is a need to create funds to redevelop older
communities in the region. The second area is land use
planning with the goal being to maximize limited
infrastructure resources, reduce discriminatory barriers to
affordable housing, and protect open spaces and the
environment through more cooperative land use planning.
The third area is regional governance structure, with the
goal being to coordinate the needs of regional communities
through structural reform.
While members of this "New Regionalist" school agree
on the existing problems within regional areas, there has
been a sharp debate about the structure of solutions. One
school of thought, led by Richard Briffault at Columbia Law
School, was framed by two massive and influential articles
written by Briffault in 1990. Briffault generally called for
increasing the pressure on state government to redistribute
equity and create state wide and regional land use planning
frameworks. This would level the playing field in terms of
taxation, and reduce the powers of local governments to
exclude outsiders through land use planning. 74 Briffault
73. See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARv. L.
REV. 2255 (2003); David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); Briffault, Our Localism: Part
I, supra note 10, at 1; Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 10; Richard
Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, Boundary Problem]; Sheryll D.
Cashin, Civil Rights in the New Decade: The Geography of Opportunity, 31
CUMB. L. REV. 467 (2001); Cashin, supra note 10; Gerald E. Frug, Beyond
Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV 1763 (2002); Gerald E. Frug, supra note
10; Gerald E. Frug, The City as Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980);
Ford, supra note 10; Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial
Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173 (1995-96); Reynolds, supra
note 10.
74. Followers of the school of thought led by Richard Briffault include
Cheryl Cashin and Laurie Reynolds.
2007]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
also called for creating stronger regional governments in
metropolitan America. Adherents of this reform vision could
be called the state power/regional government group.
Another school of thought has been led by Gerald Frug
at Harvard Law School. As outlined in his important book
City Making, the synthesis of a generation of his legal
scholarship, Frug believes that the regional problems noted
above can be solved by empowering cities with greater
inherent authority so that they can truly compete in the
marketplace; 75 by creating more permeable municipal
boundaries, by creating rights of regional citizenship, and
by exploring new notions of cross border rights and
responsibilities in what he calls a regional legislature. Frug
also explores the ideas of representation and democracy. 76
B. The Pessimism of the New Regionalists
While there has been coherence among new regionalist
scholars about objectives, there has been a certain
hopelessness in the law and other fields about making
political/legislative progress on regional disparities. 77 The
schools realize that the legal and cultural foregrounding of
local self-interest,78 a tendency to cooperate only on narrow
75. Followers of the school of thought led by Gerald Frug include David
Barron and Richard Ford.
76. See Myron Orfield, Comment on Scott A. Bollens's "In Through the Back
Door: Social Equity and Regional Governance," 13 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 659
(2002).
77. See DOWNS, supra note 10, at 195 ("odds are against" coalition forming to
adopt equitable metropolitan growth strategies); Scott A. Bollens, In Through
the Back Door: Social Equity and Regional Governance, 13 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE
659 (2002) (most equity policies nowadays "likely insufficient" in absence of
comprehensive, locally determined agenda); Briffault, Boundary Problem, supra
note 73, at 1171 ("There is little reason to be optimistic about the prospects for
metropolitan governance."); Harold Wolman et al., Cities and State Legislatures:
Changing Coalitions and the Metropolitan Agenda 35 (Geo. Wash. Inst. Of Pub.
Pol'y, Working Paper No. 3, 2003), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~gwipp/
papers/wp003 (though transportation is a good area for city-suburban
cooperation, "[m]ore redistributive policies ... face much greater difficulties in
attracting supporters"); cf. Cashin, supra note 10, at 2048 (noting "only mild[]
optimis[m]" of author regarding the possibility of an equitable regionalism).
78. Donald F. Norris, Prospects for Regional Governance Under the New
Regionalism: Economic Imperatives Versus Political Impediments, 23 J. URBAN
AFF. 557, 562-63 (2001); see also Reynolds, supra note 10, at 131.
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and technical areas, 79 and powerful suburban interests,8 0
are formidable barriers to change. Many new regionalist
scholars would agree with Donald Norris's assessment of
the possibilities for real equitable change:
My conclusion is decidedly pessimistic. Because of the formidable
political factors that hinder its development, the probability of
achieving regional governance anywhere in the US in the
foreseeable future is very low. At least it is low in the absence of a
sustained crisis or crises which would require local governments in
a region to cede some of their local autonomy and cooperate in
meaningful ways or which would require senior levels of
government to step in and force some form of regional governance.
Clearly, however, history is not very sanguine that such will
occur.
8 1
This pessimism is somewhat justified, as regional
inequity is largely rooted in long-established competition
between cities. Cities are at once both the most powerful
local actors and the most visible ones. In this approach,
however, the new regionalism has ignored two very broad
initiatives that concern the second fundamental level of the
metropolis-school desegregation and fiscal equalization.
Courts have crossed and blurred the boundaries of local
government in two very important respects through school
desegregation and fiscal equalization. School desegregation
efforts represent the nation's only meaningful attempt to
break down the walls of racial segregation. Driven by
federal courts and Congress, this effort made a huge
difference in terms of integration and opening up life
opportunity for a huge number of children of color in this
country. Sadly, progress peaked in the mid-1970s when the
Milliken case shielded suburban districts from integration
and schools have begun to resegregate since courts allowed
dismantlement of long-settled desegregation plans in the
mid-1990s. 8 2 The remedies which remain, such as hundreds
79. Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity
Strategies, 8 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 11, 13 (1997); Briffault, Our Localism: Part
II, supra note 10, at 376; Reynolds, supra note 10, at 137, 144-45.
80. Norris, supra note 78, at 564-65.
81. Id. at 569.
82. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 7171 (1974); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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of millions of dollars of state funds to poor segregated
schools such as Detroit, Kansas City, and other districts
that could not be integreated with their suburbs (Milliken
II funds), have been much less effective in helping promote
opportunity and neighborhood stability than desegregative
programs like busing.8 3
The other major area of activity, the subject of this
Article, relates to school fiscal equity. Driven by state
courts and the formation of legislative coalitions in nearly
every state of the union, equity in school funding continues
to expand in the nation today.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECT OF MODERN SCHOOL
FINANCE REFORM
A. Federal Equal Protection and School Equity
Federal equal protection challenges to state finance
systems largely started and ended with San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriquez,8 4 a challenge to
the Texas school finance system.8 5 The case, brought on
behalf of Mexican-American children from a school district
of very low property tax wealth, claimed that the Texas
funding system discriminated against the poor and those in
poor districts. The Supreme Court acknowledged the
finance system's disparities by contrasting the school
spending between the plaintiffs school district, which
overwhelmingly had students of color and low assessed
property values, with another city district, which was
predominantly white and had high assessed property
values.8 6 Given funding from all sources, the property-poor,
minority district was able to spend $356 per pupil, while
83. See generally Institute on Race & Poverty, Minority Subordination,
Stable Integration, and Economic Opportunity in Fifteen Metropolitian Regions
(March, 2006), http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:SERvG1E5WBOJ:
www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/SummaryReport_030602.pdf+busing+ne
ighborhood+stability+detroit&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us.
84. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
85. Id. at 4-5.
86. See id. at 11-13.
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the property-rich, white district spent $594 per pupil5 7 The
students from the poor school district claimed that the
finance system violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause by unconstitutionally discriminating on
the basis of wealth and by burdening the fundamental right
to education.88  The Supreme Court rejected both
arguments.
The Court distinguished the plaintiffs case from
previous wealth discrimination claims by stating that there
was no evidence that the finance system discriminated
against poor people, noting that poor people could live in
property-rich districts.8 9 The Court also noted that the
finance system's disparities were only a relative
deprivation, and that precedent had only recognized
absolute deprivations. 90 As long as students received some
education-and evidence showed they were receiving an
"adequate" one-the Equal Protection Clause would not be
violated.91
The Court also found, notwithstanding the strong
suggestion in Brown v. Board of Education,92 that education
is not a fundamental right. Although the Court recognized
that education was linked to constitutionally-recognized
rights to speech, it found no evidence that the finance
system undermined these rights: "no charge fairly could be
made that the system fails to provide each child with an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary
for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process. '93
In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the Court
acknowledged its decision was informed by federalist
deference to states on education and revenue matters94 and
87. Id. at 12-13.
88. Id. at 19-20, 29.
89. Id. at 22-23.
90. Id. at 23-24.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-37.
94. Id. at 40-44.
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concern that finding a constitutional violation could mean
greater equity in funding other public services. 95
B. State Litigation
After Rodriguez, challenges to school finance inequity
have taken place in the courts of four out of five states.96
Plaintiff theories have centered on the equal protection and
education clauses of state constitutions. Litigants
challenging under the Equal Protection Clause argue that
education is a fundamental right or wealth a suspect class,
entitling financing schemes to greater scrutiny or that such
laws are simply irrational. 97 Courts usually use different
tests to determine whether a fundamental right is violated
by a given educational system than the one used by the
Supreme Court in Rodriguez, 98 but are more deferential in
their suspect class analysis. 99 Low-wealth districts have
also argued that school finance systems violate state
constitutional requirements regarding state provision of
public schools. 100 While early suits under both equal
protection and education clauses sought to remedy funding
inequality, most recent suits have focused on ensuring the
95. Id. at 54-55.
96. Perry A. Zirkel & Jacqueline A. Kearns-Barber, A Tabular Overview of
The School Finance Litigation, 197 EDUC. L. REP. 21, 22 (2005) ("41 states have
been the scene of pertinent published court decisions.").
97. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School
Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 107-08 (1995).
98. See William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State
Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1639, 1671-72 (1989).
99. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1021
(Colo. 1982) (using Supreme Court precedent and state cases relying on
Supreme Court precedent to find no suspect class); see also Jennifer L. Palmer,
Comment, Education Funding: Equality Versus Quality-Must New York's
Children Choose?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 917, 926 (1995) ("[Flew state courts have
diverged from the Supreme Court's holding that poverty does not constitute a
suspect class."). But see Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (finding
classifications by district wealth suspect); accord Washakie County Sch. Dist. v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980).
100. See Thro, supra note 98, at 1661-70.
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adequacy of students' educational experience, and used
education clauses to do so.101
The results of lawsuits have been largely successful.
Overall, twenty five states have declared their school
systems unconstitutional while eighteen have upheld their
systems in the face of legal challenge. 10 2 Sometimes
litigation strategies experienced several failures before
ultimately succeeding. In Texas, for instance, a challenge to
the school finance system which began in 1984 was only
resolved over ten years later, after several trips to the state
supreme court and several attempts by the legislature to
meet state constitutional requirements. 103 The same legal
theory can produce very different results in different states.
In New Jersey an adequacy theory in Abbott v. Burke0 4
profoundly redistributed money to the central city, after
previous suits had failed to do so. 1 05 The racial composition
of a district also has an effect on the likelihood of success-
white districts have been considerably more successful than
minority districts. 106
101. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L.
REV. 597, 604 (1994). Although scholarly focus of late has been on education
clause suits, plaintiffs still challenge on equal protection grounds. John Dayton
& Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 2351, 2382 n.177 (2004).
102. ACCESS, "Equity" and "Adequacy" School Funding Court Decisions,
Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/stateby-state.php3 (last
visited Oct. 10, 2006) (citing Molly A. Hunter, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc.,
State-By-State Status of School Finance Litigation (2005)).
103. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d 450, 459-61 (Tex.
1995).
104. Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998).
105. Catherine Gewertz, A Level Playing Field, EDUC. WK., Jan. 6, 2005, at
42 (noting that post-Abbott, poor districts are spending "nearly what the richest
districts spend").
106. See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98
MICH. L. REV. 432, 455 (1999). Minority districts are able to reach or exceed
state spending averages largely through funding from desegregation funds,
funds which will dwindle as court desegregation orders are lifted. See id. at 436-
37, 445-46.
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C. Legislative Reform
Partially as a result of litigation, state legislatures
have changed the way they finance school districts
frequently in the past thirty years. As discussed above,
scholars have long known of the inequity wrought by
reliance on local taxes, 107 and state legislatures have
attempted to tackle the problem sporadically throughout
the twentieth century. Around the time challenges to
finance systems began to be filed, states began a new wave
of reform, in both those states being sued and those not
(yet) sued. 0 8  Recent reform has increased the total
spending on education and reduced the reliance on local
taxes. Adjusting for inflation, spending per pupil increased
from $4,352 during the 1970-71 school year to $8,742
during the 2000-01 year. 109
States have also changed their formulas for funding
and the methods of obtaining revenue to fund schools.
Although public education is still generally financed by a
mix of federal, state, and local sources, the relative weight
accorded to each source varies greatly from state to state, as
well as the methods for allocating state aid. 1 0 Most states
establish and fund a minimum level of state aid for each
student, provided a district taxes at a minimum rate."'
This funding is often augmented by categorical aid, that is,
aid based on district characteristics, including poverty, cost
of living, and district size.11 2 A few states give districts
107. See supra Part I.B.2.
108. William N. Evans et al., Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses
After Serrano, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10, 11 tbl.1 (1997) (between 1971
and 1992, reform was court-mandated in sixteen states and not so mandated in
twenty-one).
109. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. supra note 49, at 204 tbl.166,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d03/tables/dt166.asp (last visisted April 8,
2007).
110. For a good basic overview of funding methods, see Jeffrey Metzler,
Inequitable Equilibrium: School Finance in the United States, 36 IND. L. REV.
561, 569-73 (2003).
111. See generally Yao Huang et al., A Guide to State Court Decisions on
Education Finance, in HELPING CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: STATE AID AND THE
PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL EQUITY (John Yinger ed., 2004).
112. See id. at 344-45 app.B, tbl.B.5.
110 [Vol. 55
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
solely a per capita amount, regardless of need, wealth or
income, while a handful of states finance their education
solely by equalizing the fiscal capacity of districts. 113
Equalization programs ensure that districts who tax at the
same rate will receive the same revenue regardless of the
resources within the district." 4 A sizable number of states
combine the foundation and equalization methods in tiered
systems.115
Different constituencies benefit from legislative choices
in funding. When reform is in response to grassroots
pressure, rather than litigation, the interests of each group
becomes important for purposes of coalition building. Fiscal
equalization helps rural areas, low property wealth
suburban areas, and very poor central cities. Per capita
payments help everyone, but do not achieve fairness for
poor districts. 116 Need-based systems tend to help very
segregated cities and older rural areas with high poverty,
but can also help less poor rural areas, places that have
high capital costs, and places with older teachers.
Categorical equity, it is much more likely to flow to urban
and minority districts. Equalization is more likely to follow
the bedroom developing districts. Democrats like
categorical formulas that give money to central cities, older
suburbs, and bedroom suburbs and rural areas-the classic
swing voters in the last election. Republicans wish to avoid
equity sometimes. At other times, they support equalization
which unites bedroom and rural areas and does not benefit
cities. They also like per capita distribution that gives
money to everyone.
113. See id. at 337 app.B, tbl.B.3. Flat grants are increasingly rare. See
ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
173 (1992).
114. See generally John Yinger, State Aid and the Pursuit of Educational
Equity: An Overview, in HELPING CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND, supra note 111, at 3,
12-13 (describing aid formula for guaranteed Tax Base Aid).
115. See Huang, supra note 111, at 337 app.B, tbl.B.3
116. See COONS ET AL., supra note 45, at 55-60.
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Foundation Foundation & Categorical Aid State Share Year ofState Equalizing Poverty Language Disability 1997 2000 the Data
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii'
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island'
2003
2003
2002'
2003
2002'
2003
2002-2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2002'
2003
2003
2002-2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2002'
2000
2002'
2003
2003
2002-2003
2003
2003
2002'
2003
2003
2003
x x x
x x x
x x
x x
x
x x x
x
x
x x x
x x
x x x
x x x
x
x x x
x x x
x x x
x x x
x x x
x x
x
x
x
x
x x
x x
x x
2007] SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 113
Foundation Foundation & Categorical Aid State Share Year ofState Equalizing Poverty Language Disability 1997 2000 the Data
South Carolina X X 62 59 2002'
South Dakota X X 44 42 2003
Tennessee X X 53 51 2003
Texas X X X X 49 48 2003
Utah X X X X 70 70 2003
Vermont X X X X 33 85 2003
Virginia X X X X 45 45 2003
Washington X X X X 76 72 2002'
West Virginia X X X 71 69 2003
Wisconsin X X X X 55 55 2001
Wyoming X X X X 52 59 2003
Total 5 44 31 38 48 55 56
'Hawaii has no aid system. It is 100% state supported.
6 Rhode Island discontinued its foundation program in 1999, and now provides state funding through a general aid
program. The general aid dollar amount is based upon what districts received in the previous year, and adjustments
are made based on legislative prerogative.
°NCLS data
Recent reform has successfully remedied much funding
inequity. Between 1970-1971 and 2000-2001, the
percentage of school revenue supplied by local sources
decreased from 52.5% to 43.1%. 117 Now funding from local
sources and state sources is relatively equal."8 Case studies
of individual states have reported that equity reforms
increased spending in poorer districts and/or narrowed the
gap between spending in rich and poor districts." 9
Arguably, the effect of reform depends on the role of the
117. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 49, at tbl.156, http://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d03/tables/dt 156. asp.
118. See Yinger, supra note 114, at 10; COONS ET AL., supra note 45, at 66-
68.
119. See Joydeep Roy, Impact of School Finance Reform on Resource
Equalization and Academic Performance: Evidence from Michigan, 3 (2003)
(reviewing studies of California, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Vermont)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=630121.
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courts. One study found that court-ordered reform was
more successful than reform not undertaken by court order
in both increasing the share of revenue taken by state aid
and in targeting increases to poor districts. 120 In contrast, a
paper studying reform in Michigan, which was not
mandated by litigation, showed substantial equalization in
expenditures among districts. 121 The, still significant,
reliance on local funds has a negative effect. Rising
inequality in local tax revenues can offset much of the
effects of finance reform.122
The effect of school finance reform on student
achievement is less certain but appears positive. Studies
have found or suggested a modest increase in SAT scores
following court-mandated reform,123 an increase in test
scores among high school seniors following both court-
mandated and non-court mandated reform (though only the
former was uniform), 124 modest increases in some, but not
all standardized scores for students following one state's
reform, 25 and lower drop-out rates after reform.126
IV. CASE STUDY IN SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: THE
KENTUCKY EDUCATION REFORM ACT: WHAT WAS THE
PERCENTAGE CHANGE?
In the past fifteen years, Kentucky has made
significant progress in increasing school funding equity.
Before reform, the state's education system was among the
worst in the United States. 127 Kentucky ranked at the very
120. Evans et al., supra note 108, at 28.
121. See Roy, supra note 119, at 9.
122. David Card & A. Abigail Payne, School Finance Reform, the
Distribution of School Spending, and the Distribution of Student Test Scores, 83
J. PUB. ECON. 49, 67 (2002).
123. Id. at 80.
124. See Thomas A. Downes & David N. Figlio, School Finance Reforms, Tax
Limits, and Student Performance 30-31 (Dep't of Econ., Tufts Univ., Working
Paper 98-05, 1998), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/ econlpapers/9805.pdf.
125. See Roy, supra note 119, at 26.
126. See Caroline M. Hoxby, All School Finance Equalizations Are Not
Created Equal, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1189, 1227-28 (2001).
127. See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and
Education Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 486 (1999).
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bottom of states in per-pupil expenditures, adult literacy,
adults with high school diplomas, and was near the bottom
in student/teacher ratios and average teacher salary.128
After 1979, school districts were funded by foundation and
equalization plans which, when combined with tax and
assessment policies, had little effect. 129 Before reform, the
ninety-fifth percentile of districts raised $3,262 while the
fifth percentile only raised $1,839.130 Fulton County School
District in western Kentucky could not afford to repair the
leaky bathroom in its 1916 administration building,
whereas Jefferson County School District was able to rely
on Louisville area businesses for millions each year and
provided its schools with "the highest degree of
computerization in the country."13l When the legality of the
finance system was finally challenged successfully, the
court noted that these funding inequities clearly translated
into educational inequities, as students in poorer school
districts had lower test scores and higher student-teacher
ratios than those in affluent districts and received
"inadequate and inferior educational opportunities" in
comparison. 132
Concerned Kentuckians had tried to improve the
system for decades,1 33 but the 1980s saw a fresh wave of
activity regarding education reform. One of the most
prominent pro-reform organizations was the Prichard
Committee for Academic Excellence. Officially founded in
1983 and with roots running back several years earlier, the
Committee is an organization of parents, prominent
citizens, and community and business leaders who write,
128. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR KENTUCKY SCHOOL REFORM, FROM DILEMMA TO
OPPORTUNITY: A REPORT ON EDUCATION IN KENTUCY 6 (1995).
129. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W. 2d 186, 196-97 (Ky.
1998).
130. Jacob E. Adams, Jr. & William E. White II, The Equity Consequence of
School Finance Reform in Kentucky, 19 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS
165, 174 tbl.3 (1997).
131. Cynthia Mitchell, Kentucky Aims to Make Public Schools Equal
Lawsuit Sparks Action to Help Poorer Districts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 27,
1989, at A16.
132. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197.
133. See Ronald G. Dove, Jr., Acorns in a Mountain Pool: The Role of
Litigation, Law and Lawyers in Kentucky Education Reform, 17 J. EDUC. FIN.
83, 86-87 (1991).
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lobby, and educate the public on issues of education
reform. 134 One of the Committee's earliest successes was its
organization of 145 town forums on education reform on one
day in November of 1984, which about 20,000 people
attended. 135 Separate from the Prichard Committee, sixty-
six school districts organized the Council for Better
Education in 1985, which was focused on promoting equity
in Kentucky schools through litigation. 136
A. Rose v. Council for Better Education
Hoping to force education reform, a group of plaintiffs,
headed by the Council for Better Education, filed a
complaint in 1985 challenging the state's education system
as violating the state constitution's education clause. 137
Section 183 of the Kentucky constitution states that the
General Assembly, comprised of the state's Senate and
House of Representatives, "shall, by appropriate legislation,
provide for an efficient system of common schools
throughout the State.' 138  The trial court declared
Kentucky's system unconstitutional and appointed a select
committee to gather evidence and provide guidance as to
what a constitutionally adequate system of schools would
entail. 39 The President Pro Tem of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House, both named defendants, appealed to
the Kentucky Supreme Court, which decided the matter in
134. See HARVARD FAMILY RESEARCH PROJECT, THE PRICHARD COMMITTEE FOR
ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE: BUILDING CAPACITY FOR PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN EDUC.
REFORM 5-6 (2000), http://www.gse.harvard.edu/-hfrp/content/projects/fine/
resources/case-study/prichard committee.pdf.
135. Crystal Harden, Dusting off the Armor, KY. POST, Nov. 11, 2003,
available at http://www.kypost.com/2003/11/15/ prich 111503.html.
136. Hunter, supra note 127, at 492.
137. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190; see also Dove, supra note 133, at 93. The
plaintiffs also alleged violations of the federal constitution, and the trial court
found a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190, 194.
Given its finding of a state constitutional violation, the Kentucky Supreme
Court found it "unnecessary" to review these federal constitutional claims. Id.
at 215.
138. 2004 Ky. Rev. Stat. Adv. Legis. Serv. 628 (LexisNexis).
139. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 192-93.
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a 1989 opinion titled Rose v. Council for Better
Education.140
In Council for Better Education, the state supreme
court ruled that the General Assembly had not met its
constitutional responsibility and invalidated the state's
school system. 141 The court's evidentiary review found a
"tidal wave" of evidence that showed that Kentucky's public
schools were under funded and inadequate, particularly for
students in property-poor districts. 142 The court also
reviewed the history of Section 183 and found that the
section created a fundamental right to education. 143 In
reaching its conclusion, the opinion emphasized several
themes: (1) reform is solely the legislature's duty; 144 (2)
reform must be directed at the "whole gamut" of Kentucky's
school system; 145 and (3) reform must promote equality
among schools and districts. 46 The court, however, refused
to order a specific course of reform, a choice with which one
concurring justice disagreed. 147 It did, however, set out
minimum steps for compliance and established a set of
curricular goals, which included academic, artistic, civic,
and vocational proficiency. 148
B. The Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) of 1990
The Council for Better Education court withheld the
finality of its decision to give the General Assembly time to
140. Id. at 191.
141. Id. at 215.
142. Id. at 197.
143. Id. at 206.
144. See id. at 205, 211-12, 216.
145. See id. at 215; see also id. at 205, 208. This requirement was
particularly striking, as no previous case had declared an entire system
unconstitutional on an adequacy theory. C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C.
Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 599, 608, 608 n.71 (1995).
146. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 207, 211-12.
147. Id. at 215 ("We decline to issue any injunctions, restraining orders,
writs of prohibition or writs of mandamus."); see also id. at 216-18 (Gant, J.,
concurring).
148. See id. at 212.
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create a new system of common schools in Kentucky. 149
Within the year, the Assembly passed the Kentucky
Education Reform Act (KERA) of 1990.150 KERA changed
large swaths of state education law, focusing on curriculum,
school governance, and school finance.' 5 ' The non-finance
reforms included standardization of curricula, textbooks,
and teacher certification, as well as reorganization of the
state's department of education. 152 As part of the financial
reform, KERA created the Support Education Excellence in
Kentucky (SEEK) formula. 153 SEEK establishes a base
payment-per-student, with districts receiving more aid for
transportation costs and for students from low-income
families and students with special needs. 54 In 2004-05, the
basic payment was $3,222.155 Each district is required to
tax at a given minimum rate, with the state paying the
difference between the local revenue and the adjusted base
payment. 156 Districts also have two optional funding
choices, both of which allow the district to raise additional
funds, and one of which equalizes funds for districts below a
certain level of assessed property.157
KERA both increased the total education expenditures
and brought poorer districts closer to the levels of the
wealthier districts. Adjusted for inflation, expenditures on
primary and secondary education in Kentucky increased
149. Id. at 216.
150. 1990 Ky. Acts 1208.
151. Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 145, at 610.
152. Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Reform and Systemic School
Change: Reconstituting Kentucky's Public Schools, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 318, 328-29
(1993).
153. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 157.310-.440 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005).
154. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.360(2) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005).
155. CINDY HEINE, PRICHARD COMM. FOR AcAD. EXCELLENCE, KENTUCKY
SCHOOL UPDATES: A PARENT/CITIZEN GUIDE FOR 2004-2006 at 2 (2004),
http://www.prichardcommittee.org/pubs/04_KSU/School Finance.rtf.
156. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.740(a); see also Lawrence 0. Picus et al.,
Assessing the Equity of Kentucky's SEEK Formula: A 10-Year Analysis, 29 J.
EDUC. FIN. 315, 317 (2004).
157. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.440(1)(a), (2)(a) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp.
2005).
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from $2.1 billion in 1989-1990 to $4 billion in 2000-2001.158
The increase was also equitable. In the program's first eight
years, revenue in property-poor districts rose significantly,
while revenue in more affluent districts rose more
modestly. 15 9 A recent study employed multiple tests of
inequity and concluded that the SEEK formula has
achieved "a substantial degree of fiscal equity."'160 Where
there was previously a large gap between affluent and poor
districts, after KERA, "the link between property wealth
and revenue per pupil is essentially gone.' 16 1
Nonetheless, further progress is needed. Although
Kentucky is far ahead of most states in terms of equitable
funding, to provide an adequate education for each child
would likely require a higher basic payment. 162 In fact, the
Council for Better Education recently filed a new lawsuit
alleging that the General Assembly has failed to adequately
fund education, noting that the percentage of money spent
on education has declined between 1994 and 2003.163
V. LESSONS FROM KERA AND COUNCIL FOR BETTER
EDUCATION
Central to the success of education reform in Kentucky
was broad popular support. Hard work, wise strategies, and
good luck united a significant portion of the population
behind education reform and kept them supportive. Given
the importance of KERA, there has been significant work
done interviewing key players in litigation and reform,
analyzing strategies, timing, and messages. 164 The details
158. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., DIG. OF EDUC. STAT. TABLES & FIGURES
(2003), supra note 49, at tbl. 161, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dO3/tables/
dtl6l.asp.
159. Ann E. Flanagan & Sheila E. Murray, A Decade of Reform: The Impact
of School Reform in Kentucky, in HELPING CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND, supra note
11, at 195, 204-05.
160. Picus et al., supra note 156, at 334-35.
161. Id. at 334-35.
162. See id.
163. Nancy C. Rodriguez, School District Out of Funding Suit, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 28, 2003, at lB.
164. See generally Bert T. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law: The
Kentucky School Reform Law, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367 (1991); Dove, supra
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of how litigation led to real legislative reform and more
equity in Kentucky yield some lessons for future school
finance reformers, and perhaps those seeking to remedy
inequity in other policy areas.
A. Broad public support for reform
Those who sought to reform the education system in
Kentucky benefited from tremendous public awareness of
Kentucky's educational inadequacy and widespread support
for reform. Those who sought reform actively cultivated
this; for example, the lead councel for the plaintiffs
understood the importance of strength in numbers and only
took the case after a substantial percentage of districts
agreed to join in the effort. 165 Many other factors
contributed to this widespread public understanding.
note 133; Hunter, supra note 127; Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the
Politics of Reform: Lessons From School Finance Litigation in Kentucky, 1984-
1995, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 631 (2001).
165. See Dove, supra note 133, at 90-91 (citing Interview with Bert T.
Combs, Lexington, Ky. (Nov. 8, 1990)); Paris, supra note 164, at 648-49.
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1. Clear Problem. Reformers in Kentucky "benefited"
from the fact that its schools were truly awful. It may have
been possible to argue the nuances of what the Kentucky
Constitution demanded, but it wasn't feasible to hide the
fact the Kentucky public schools were very bad.
2. Efforts to Educate the Public. The Prichard
Committee did a great deal to raise the profile of the issue
of school quality and funding. In addition to organizing the
town forums in 1984, the Committee issued numerous
reports and helped increase media attention to the failed
Kentucky school system. Committee Director Robert Sexton
visited civic clubs around the state to educate citizens about
educational problems and the need for reform in light of
Kentucky's changing economy. Moreover, whereas the poor
district plaintiffs were part of the school system, members
of the Committee were not school or government officials,
the Committee was funded through private contributions,
and therefore, the Committee was respected as an
independent source. 166
3. Newspaper Coverage Favorable to Reform. The
Lexington Herald Leader, the Kentucky Post, and the
Louisville Courier-Journal all ran dramatic features on the
dire condition of the state's system of public education.
4. High Profile Leadership. Education reform was
advocated by a number of prominent Kentuckians, not least
of whom was the lead attorney for the Council for Better
Education, Bert Combs, a former governor and judge in
both the federal and state court systems. Influential
citizens were also members of the Prichard Committee. The
stature of these reform proponents helped bring publicity
and credibility to the cause.
5. Committed Support from the Business Community.
Reformers also enjoyed strong and consistent support from
Kentucky's business community, which saw education as a
way to fill and maintain positions and attract new
business. 167 For example, Ashland Oil ran ads in support of
education reform.
166. See Hunter, supra note 127, at 489-90.
167. See id. at 490-91.
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6. The Grassroots Group. In the late 1980s, virtually all
of Kentucky's education advocacy groups-teachers
associations, PTA groups, administrators associations, the
Catholic Conference, the Chamber of Commerce, etc.-came
together to form a coalition originally called the Grassroots
Group, now known as the Education Association. The group
met quietly for about two years and completed a report
giving reform recommendations prior to the supreme court
ruling. The fact that these disparate groups came to
consensus on reform proposals and were able to meet the
legislature as a united front had a huge influence on the
ultimate substantive outcome of KERA, affecting
legislative, if not popular, opinion.
B. Strategies that Facilitated Broad Support Were Selected
A reform strategy should take into account the roles of
both the general public and all political actors.
1. The Anti-Robin Hood Approach. Reform should not
be perceived as redistributing funding from the wealthy
districts to the poor districts. The "anti-Robin Hood"
approach used by the Kentucky litigants served several
aims. First, it recognized the general lack of funds in
Kentucky's schools, even in more affluent districts. Second,
and strategically the most important, it allowed the lawsuit
to go forward without much opposition from wealthy
districts. 168 Although property-poor districts were the
mainstays of the CBE, reformers approached every district
in the state, and in doing so, managed to win overt and
informal support from some affluent districts and generally
minimize opposition.1 6 9 Although the sweeping nature of
the supreme court's decision went far beyond "leveling up"
or "leveling down,"17 0 the anti-Robin Hood approach helped
make the litigation palatable to all districts, and thus
successful.
2. Wise Litigation Strategy: Litigation was Framed as a
Last Resort. The Kentucky plaintiffs also waited until
168. See Dove, supra note 133, at 115.
169. See Paris, supra note 164, at 649.
170. Id. at 649 n.23.
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legislative reform had failed before pursuing court action.
The state had a long history of school finance reform, with
little success. The Council for Better Education plaintiffs
waited until after a 1985 special session on education had
come up short before filing its suit. 171 Because counsel
Combs waited to file the suit until after the legislature
failed to enact and fund the reforms, he was able to address
the media and critics without appearing to be litigation-
hungry. He was thus able to tell the press in early 1986
that he and the superintendents "were reluctant to file the
case, but thought they had a duty to do so."'17 2
3. Litigation Was Targeted to Avoid Separation of
Powers Issues as Much as Possible. The lawsuit asserted
that the defendants, members of the executive and
legislative branches, had failed in their constitutional duty.
Given the inevitable separation-of-powers struggle that
would arise if the court ordered the legislature to reform
the system, the plaintiffs aimed for a declaratory judgment
of unconstitutionality. 1 73 They hoped that a court decision
would generate and mobilize grassroots support, which
would, in turn, force the General Assembly to act. 174
4. The Lawsuit Provided Cover for Politicians. The
victory in Council for Better Education did not necessarily
guarantee Kentucky an adequate education system. Many
expected that the General Assembly would either not
respond at all or would make rhetorical, rather than
substantive, change. 75 Past legislative efforts at school
reform had been thwarted by the reluctance to raise taxes.
The governor at the time, Wallace G. Wilkinson, had been
171. See Paris, supra note 164, at 649.
172. Combs Calls School Finance Suit the Best Way to Settle Issue, COURIER-
J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 19, 1986, at B8 (cited in Paris, supra note 164, at 650).
173. See Combs, supra note 164, at 372. Such intergovernmental fighting
had already occurred by the time Council for Better Education was decided.
When the complaint in the case was filed, the state senate passed a bill making
it illegal to sue the state with money from school funds. See Dove, supra note
133, at 94-95. As the Council had used funds from each of the plaintiff districts,
this would have quickly ended the lawsuit. Id. at 92, 94-95. Fortunately for the
reformers, the bill died in committee in the House. Id. at 95.
174. See Combs, supra note 164, at 372.
175. See id. at 375.
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elected on a no-new-taxes platform and legislators were
loath to propose taxation without the governor's
agreement. 176 The supreme court's decision, and the
accompanying media coverage, made education the top
public priority and provided "cover" for both the governor
and the General Assembly to raise the taxes necessary to
fund reform.177
5. Good Legislative Strategy. The legislature, by
funding the education reforms in the same bill that
provided for the reforms, denied an easy way out for
legislators opposed to the reforms. Legislators couldn't vote
for reform and then underfund it later, so reform opponents
were forced to go on the record as actually opposing the
reforms.
6. Political Tradeoffs Were Used to Garner Votes in the
Legislature. Leadership in the legislature effectively
leveraged rewards for reform proponents and retribution
against reform opponents. "Pet projects" were awarded and
taken away in efforts to garner support for KERA.
C. Strong Legislative Coalitions are Not Required for
Reform
Although KERA suggests that strong support from
citizens and business interests are necessary for reform, the
history of its enactment makes clear that legislative
coalitions are less important. Despite the divide between
poor and rich school districts, there did not seem to be any
strong coalitions with the General Assembly either for or
against KERA. The substantive work was done by
committee, with occasional input from the Council for
Better Education. 178 Rather than coalition building based
on similarities in school districts or tax capacity, legislative
leaders promised spending in districts that would vote yes
on the education reform package and cut funding in
districts where representatives looked to be voting against
176. See Paris, supra note 164, at 655-56.
177. See id. at 665-66 & n.44 (citing numerous polls illustrating how
strongly the public favored education reform).
178. See Dove, supra note 133, at 105-08.
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the package. 179 Northern Kentucky lost both a library and
an arena because only two of its eight house members were
planning to vote in favor of the reform plan. 80 By the time
the bill arrived in the Senate, senators representing
Northern Kentucky voted for the education bill and
attempted to persuade the Senate leaders to push their
projects back into the budget.' 8 '
Though deal making predominated rather than political
coalitions, voting did to some extent follow class and
regional lines. Kentucky's counties generally fall into three
geographic categories: (1) metropolitan counties; (2) rural
counties adjacent to metropolitan areas; and (3) rural
counties in outlying areas of the state.18 2 The metropolitan
areas have seen the largest increase in tax bases while
outlying rural counties have much smaller tax bases and
have seen much smaller increases. 8 3 Predictably, almost
half of the forty-two "Nay" votes in the House came from
wealthier metropolitan areas. 8 4 With higher property
values, the state's three metropolitan areas (Lexington,
Louisville, and Northern Kentucky-Cincinnati) were and
are able to more easily contribute to their local school
districts than are areas that have limited fiscal capacity.
Despite the gain in funding that they would receive under
KERA, fifteen house members from Appalachian counties
voted against KERA. l8 5
179. Bill Bishop, Making Deals for Better Schools-But at What Cost?,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 25, 1990, at Fl.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Myron Orfield, Kentucky's Rural/Metropolitan Fiscal Divide: A
Statewide Agenda for Sustainable Communities (Report to The Mountain Ass'n
for Cmty. Econ. Dev. and The S. Rural Dev. Initiative) (May, 2000) (on file with
author).
183. Id. at 10.
184. In the Northern Kentucky-Cincinnati Metropolitan area, only two of
eight representatives voted for KERA. Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission. In Fayette County, three representatives voted Yea and two voted
Nay. Id. Jefferson County includes Louisville and has nineteen representatives,
eleven of which voted against KERA. Id.
185. Id.
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VI. CASE STUDY: MICHIGAN'S PROPOSAL A
School equity was achieved in Michigan without a
successful lawsuit. In fact, earlier legal challenges to the
school finance system had failed.186 After the dismissal of
the reform plaintiffs in Milliken v. Green,8 7 Michigan
responded to growing disparities by adopting a guaranteed
tax base formula.' 88 The state funding formula guaranteed
that each local district would receive a given yield for each
student and for each mill taxed.18 9 The state also provided
categorical aid for certain types of students and programs,
as well as including aid to districts with high taxes for other
services. 190 Unfortunately, over time the failure to adjust
the guaranteed base and weak or nonexistent recapture
provisions largely negated any equalizing effect. 19' By 1994,
38% of districts received less than $4,500 per pupil, while
only 5.5% received more than $7,000 per pupil.192
Perhaps more important for the purposes of reform was
the burden that the state's finance system had on
186. See Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Durant v. State
Bd. of Educ. 381 N.W.2d 662 (Mich. 1985); East Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348
N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
187. 212 N.W.2d at 711.
188. MICHAEL F. ADDONIZIO ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC
SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, MICHIGAN 1
(1998-99), available at http://www.nces.ed.gov/edfin/pdf/StFinance/
Michigan.pdf.
189. See William S. Koski, Comment, Equity in Public Education: School-
Finance Reform in Michigan, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 195, 231-32 (1992).
190. See id. at 232-33.
191. July Berry Cullen & Susanna Loeb, School Finance Reform in
Michigan: Evaluating Proposal A, in HELPING CHILDREN LEFr BEHIND, supra
note 111, at 215, 219-20; HANK PRINCE, HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, PROPOSAL A AND
PUPIL EQUITY (1996), http://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/prop-a.html (last visited
April 8, 2007); see also C. Philip Kearney & Li-Ju Chen, Measuring Equity in
Michigan School Finance: A Further Look, 14 J. EDUC. FIN. 319, 358-61 (1989)
(revenue and expenditure equity among districts decreased on the whole from
1979-85, with a slight uptick in 1984-85).
192. OFFICE OF REVENUE & TAx ANALYSIS, MICH. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
PROPOSAL A: A RETROSPECTIVE 35, exh. 29 (2002), http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/propa_3172_7.pdf [hereinafter PROPOSAL A: A RETROSPECTIVE].
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taxpayers. 193 Tax incentives and the guaranteed tax base
formula that subsidized property-poor school districts
encouraged voters to continue to approve higher local
property tax rates for school funding. The increasing rates
and heavy reliance on local taxes to fund schools led
Michigan to the seventh-highest property tax burden in the
United States in 1993.194
The stage for reform was set by the rejection of a 1993
ballot, called Proposal A, which would have cut operating
millage, raised the sales tax, provided more funds for poor
school districts, and capped property assessments. 195 The
defeat had been the eleventh failed property tax and school
finance reform measure since the early 1970s. 196
A. P.A. 145: A Political Double Dare Wipes the Slate Clean
Following the 1993 defeat, the legislature once again
began discussions on school finance. Although the
Republican majority leadership was planning to propose a
more modest property tax reduction plan, Debbie Stabenow,
a Senate Democrat from Macomb (a low property tax base
area), offered an amendment to the tax bill that eliminated
the use of property taxes for school revenue altogether. 97
Stabenow stated for the record in the Journal of the Senate
that the bill was designed to "guarantee that we have
comprehensive school finance reform and that we eliminate
the burden of property taxes as it relates to funding schools
in this state."'198
The Wall Street Journal characterized Senator
Stabenow's amendment, which became P.A. 145, as a
193. See Cullen & Loeb, supra note 191, at 221 (noting that taxes, not school
inequality, were the driving force behind reform).
194. PROPOSAL A: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 192, at 4.
195. See Ted Roelofs, Proposal A Expected to Draw Big Turnout, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, June 2, 1993, at Al.
196. See Michael F. Addonizio et al., Michigan's High Wire Act, 20 J. EDUC.
FIN. 235, 237-38 (1995).
197. See id. at 239.
198. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 1988 (July 20, 1993)
[hereinafter SENATE JOURNAL].
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"political double dare."199 Governor John Engler had vowed
in the 1990 election to slash property taxes, 200 but was now
faced with the option of approving a proposal to abolish the
school tax entirely. The proposal faced opposition from both
sides of the aisle in the House, whose members thought it
irresponsible to remove all funding without providing
replacement funding, and by school administrators, for
similar reasons.20 1 Senator Stabenow was put in the
position to disagree with her longtime union allies and
responded that, "we did not create a crisis; we created a
deadline for solving the crisis. '202 The bill passed both
houses and was signed by the Governor within the span of a
month.203
B. Education and Education Finance Reform
The immediate effect of the bill was to reduce revenue
for schools by $6.5 billion, 20 4 and, consequently, a new
school financing system was required. In the aftermath of
P.A. 145, the issues of how schools would be funded and the
source of that funding were bifurcated. In October of 1993,
the governor announced his plan to reform education
quality and financing,20 5 and on December 24, 1993,
legislation on education and school financing reform was
adopted. 206
The bill that had the effect of equalizing school funding
passed with broad bipartisan support, and the bill's support
and opposition were instead based on geography, with
legislators from property-rich districts generally opposed to
equalization and legislators from property-poor districts in
favor. School funding equalization passed with strong
199. Ron Suskind, Michigan's School-Aid Crisis Offers Crash Course in
Convergence of Tax and Education Revolts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1993, at A18.
200. Addonizio et al., supra note 196, at 237.
201. See Peter Luke, Bipartisan Deal May End Property Taxes for Schools,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 21, 1993, at Al.
202. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Drastic Start From Scratch On Financing for
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at A15.
203. See Addonizio et al., supra note 196, at 239.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 243.
206. See PROPOSAL A: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 192, at 3.
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support in large part because nearly two-thirds of school
districts stood to gain from equalization. The Michigan
school funding equalization was also made more palatable
by the fact that the legislature opted not to level-down
funding and instead effectively raised funding in lower
funded districts to bring them closer to richer districts.
C. Proposal A
In December of 1993, the Michigan legislature passed
an education plan that put two funding options before the
Michigan voters. If the voters approved a revamped
Proposal A, then Michigan would fund public schools from a
variety of sources, most prominently a two percent sales tax
increase and a fifty-cent-per-pack increase in the cigarette
tax.207 The income tax rate would decrease from 4.6% to
4.4%, while a per-parcel cap on assessment growth would
be set and property taxes for school operations reduced in
most districts.208 If the voters rejected Proposal A, then the
"Statutory Plan" would increase the income tax from 4.6%
to 6.0% and increase the single business tax rate from
2.35% to 2.75%.209 Under either proposal, the way school
revenues were spent would be radically changed. Michigan
would go from a guaranteed tax base system to a
foundation system, with the state guaranteeing a minimum
amount per pupil.210 For two months before the ballot,
Governor Engler campaigned for the passage of Proposal A,
routinely highlighting the fact that Proposal A raised the
sales tax while the backup plan raised the income tax.21'
Senator Stabenow supported the statutory plan, along with
207. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY & HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, THE MICHIGAN SCHOOL
AID ACT COMPILED AND APPENDICES app. A (1994), reprinted as School Finance
in Michigan Before and After the Implementation of Proposal A: A Comparison
of FY 1993-94 and FY 1994-95 Approaches to K-12 School Funding in Michigan,
available at http://senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Publications/JointRep/
finpropa/95comp.html [hereinafter SENATE FISCAL AGENCY REPORT].
208. See id.; see also Addonizio et al., supra note 196, at 255.
209. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY REPORT, supra note 207.
210. See Addonizio et al., supra note 196, at 248.
211. Peter Luke, Voters Give Sales-Tax Hike for Schools A-plus, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 16, 1994, at Al.
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teachers unions, and cigarette companies. 212 On March 15,
1994, Proposal A passed by a 69% to 31% margin with a
40% voter turnout. 213
The effect of Proposal A was to drastically cut the
contribution that local property taxes made to education.
After its adoption, the state's share of education funding
dramatically increased. State revenue for schools increased
from 28% in 1993-94 to 66% in 1998-99, while local
revenues dropped from 65% to 27%.214 The reform had an
immediate balancing effect. The restricted range of basic
payments, which measures the difference between the
highest and lowest non-outlying values, dropped 18.2%
after reform. 215 Whereas the most affluent districts saw a
growth of 6% throughout the 1990s, the poorest districts
saw a growth of 46.9%.216
VII. LESSONS FROM PROPOSAL A
As with the Kentucky case, Michigan's reform has
occasioned critical notice. 217
A. Taxpayer Revolt Can Help Forge Coalitions
A strong majority (33-4) in the state senate carried P.A.
145, with representatives from all constituencies supporting
it.218 One reason for this strong showing was that tax-
cutting reached across political and economic spectrums. In
a previous work, Thomas Luce and I classified communities
in Michigan, considering tax base, income, household
growth and density, and poverty. 219 Politicians from a wide
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. Addonizio et al., supra note 196.
215. Prince, supra note 191, tbl.5.
216. Cullen & Loeb, supra note 191, at 229.
217. See Cullen & Loeb, supra note 191; Paul N. Courant & Susanna Loeb,
Centralization of School Finance in Michigan, 16 J, POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
114 (1997); Addonizio et al., supra note 196;
218. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 198, at 1983.
219. MYRON ORFIELD & THOMAS LUCE, AMERIGIS & METRO. AREA RESEARCH
CORP., MICHIGAN METROPATTERNS 4-5, 7 (2003).
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variety of communities, ones with varying abilities to raise
revenue (capacity) and ones with high and low costs (free-
lunch-eligible-students or significant enrollment changes)
supported P.A. 145. Democratic Senator Miller, from
Detroit area Macomb County, which has both Moderate
Capacity-Low Cost and Moderate Capacity-High Cost
schools, strongly supported the legislation, stating in
reference to Senator Stabenow's amendment, "You ask to
put the challenge forward, the democrats accepted the
challenge. We want to put an end to property taxes. '' 220
Republican Senators found themselves reluctantly
supporting Democratic Senator Stabenow's amendment.
Senate Majority Leader Posthumus then welcomed the
Democrats to join with Republicans in their efforts toward
property tax reform,
the bill that we just passed with the help of both sides of the aisle
tomorrow and getting it passed in the House will probably be the
most important piece of legislation we pass this year .... I thought
the initial effort was a very cynical effort. I have to apologize to the
Minority Leader and to the original sponsor of the amendment.
After having talked to them, they were sincere and I think the
minority [Democratic Senators] was sincere in joining with us to
bring about a real property tax cut to the citizens of this state.2 2 1
Finally, senators from wealthy, high-capacity districts
found themselves voting for the amendment, even if their
school districts could lose funding through reform, because
it is difficult for a Republican Senator from a high-property
value suburb to vote against property tax reduction. The
press explained that wealthier districts that were spending
upwards of $9,500 per student stood to lose with such
drastic changes to the status quo. 222 Republican Senator
Michael Bouchard, from Oakland County, was concerned
about the bill's potential outcome and called the legislation
"a train running down the hill and nobody's the
engineer. ' 223 Bouchard's district is similar to Faxon's with
220. 2 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 1987 (July 20,
1993) [hereinafter 2 SENATE JOURNAL].
221. Id. at 1991.
222. Peter Luke, Senate Bets Property Tax Death will Help Schools, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, July 21, 1993, at Al.
223. Id.
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high-capacity cities, higher-than-average incomes and
broader-than-average property tax base.224
B. Emphasizing Equality, Rather than Equity, Can Wrest
Power from Localities
Proposal A effectively converted the state's school
finance system from a guaranteed tax base system (GTB)-
one which many think is the most equitable225-to the more
common foundation system which others think more
equitable. Although the change has reduced the disparity
between districts, it has also centralized and standardized
power. Michael Addonizio and others have noted that a
GTB program privileges local decisions regarding taxation
while equalizing the result, regardless of the district's
wealth, whereas the new system does not take into account
local effort. 226 This move towards state control (along with
standardization in non-finance areas) takes away from
localities what has traditionally been theirs, which might
make the system more susceptible to legal challenge.
Opponents of reform realized the centralizing effect of
P.A. 145, and some legislators were opposed to the reforms
for that reason. Senator Faxon was one Democrat voting
against the reform. He represented southern Oakland
County in the Detroit Metropolitan area. The school
classifications in Faxon's district range from High-Capacity-
Low Cost to Moderate Capacity-High Cost,227 and was
above both the regional median household income and
property tax base.228 Faxon explained he voted against the
Stabenow amendment because
[t]he people in my communities want property tax relief. They do
not want to lose control over their schools .... And if we are going
to just suddenly take away all the money and say everybody is
going to get it redistributed and that those districts that have been
224. Orfield & Luce, supra note 219, at 14-16.
225. See supra note 219.
226. Michael F. Addonizio et al., Blowing up the System: Some Fiscal and
Legal Perspectives on Michigan's School Finance Reform, 107 ED. L. REP. 15, 21-
22 (1996).
227. Orfield & Luce, supra note 219, at 16.
228. Id. at 14-15.
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spending $8,000 or $9,000 are going to have to learn to live with
less, then I don't know just how you intend to tell that to those
people who have been paying for education all those years. 22 9
VIII. SCHOOL FINANCE AS A TEMPLATE FOR REGIONAL
REFORM
School finance litigation and legislation has many
lessons for other areas of regional reform. First, it lays bare
the false stereotype of absolute local sovereignty. State
money flows fulsomely across district boundaries. In fact,
for the last decade school districts, with less than half of
their funding coming from local sources, can hardly be
called local fiscal sovereigns at all. Given the fact that
school funding is the largest or second-to-largest local
expenditure that local taxpayers encounter, and given the
other forms of revenue sharing that exist for counties,
cities, special districts, and MPOs, it becomes increasingly
hard to think of any of the local governments as truly
separate and sovereign. The rubicon of fiscal independence
is past, and it is time that we conceive of these local entities
as already structurally and clearly fiscally interdependent.
It is also important to realize that state court equal
protection litigation, something unique in the areas of
schools, has made a huge difference in pushing equity
through the political process. This equity is not perfect and
more often in the eye of the litigant than in the purposes of
the general public. Nevertheless, these court cases have
forced otherwise deadlocked and sclerotic legislatures to
change and even reform complex state and local systems.
Whether analogous kinds of litigation strategies can be
transferred to other areas of regional reform, such as
municipal finance, land-use law, housing, and regional
government structures, stands as a further area of inquiry.
Clearly, judicial equalization of city finance does not have
the same textual hooks or talismans, such as education
clauses,230 which inhabit most state constitutions. But there
229. 2 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 220, at 1991.
230. At least one scholar sees legal theory upon which recent school
litigation is based (i.e., state constitution education clauses) as not portable,
distinguishing or relying on Emel G6kyigit Wadhwani, Achieving Greater Inter-
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are rights to health, safety, and general welfare, which local
government scholars are beginning to explore. In the area
of land use and housing, the Mount Laurel case, though
seldom re-litigated in other states, is much admired by legal
scholars and could perhaps become the Serano of state
general welfare clause litigation. Fair housing lawsuits
such as Gautreaux and the most recent Thompson case in
Baltimore suggest bold metropolitan remedies in terms of
housing. State constitutional school desegregation cases
such as Sheff v. O'Neil and the Xiong case in Minnesota,
suggest other civil rights venues. All of this is more
speculative than certain and depends on both developing a
clear metropolitan civil rights agenda and the philanthropic
and political support to bring complex litigation.
One clear message is that these lawsuits, if they ever
occur, must be matched with aggressive public education
and organizing strategies. They cannot exist in isolation
like so much of the bussing and civil rights litigation in the
late 1970s. Kentucky showed that using litigation as a vital
part of the public process produced a much more far
reaching and satisfying result than Michigan gimmicks and
one-upmanship.
Finally, the Michigan case shows us the anger of a
property tax revolt can be channeled to change policy in a
positive way. So many times these revolts, particularly in
the western United States, have led to state constitutional
tax limitations that have fallen disproportionately on the
property-poor parts of metropolitan areas. Michigan's
Debby Stabenow shows how one of these revolts, more and
more common in the nation, can be channeled for good
purposes-good purposes which could also potentially
reform urban finance and local land use decisions.
CONCLUSION
Educational equity efforts may have a more clear
constitutional basis and hence judicial remedy. However,
the problem of inequality among local governments with
zoning powers is probably far more systematically
important to regional equity and stability. Cities and local
Local Equity in Financing Municipal Services: What We Can Learn From
School Finance Litigation, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 91 (2002).
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units with land-use powers to exclude create concentrations
of poverty competition with each other for tax ratables.
Through court mandated equity, schools get money and
property taxes are equalized-but the cities with whom
they share space continue to exclude and compete,
undermining all.
Growing state financial support of local school districts
demonstrates that, at least financially, these places are not
in any real sense, local sovereigns. Schools are often the
part of local government spending, particularly in the
suburbs. They interrelated in term of total tax rate and
quality of life, with all the other forms of local government.
Thus is a very important to understand how significantly
school equity has undermined the concept of local
sovereignty of all local government that pervades much of
legislative politics, case law, and public understanding of
cities and suburbs. These decisions have crossed the
boundaries of separate governments within a metropolitan
area and created equity-they made services and taxes
more equal within a region and took pressure off the
competition between municipalities for ratables. In this
sense the model of public education-organizing, litigation,
and legislative action is important for additional fiscal and
collateral land use and governance reform.
While understanding the importance of the cases, they
should not be oversold. They are a necessary, but not
sufficient, and as they are, they are not a panacea for
growing urban inequality in school performance. While the
newest theories of adequacy purport to provide equal
results with increased school funding to the poorest and
most segregated districts, it is clear that they will never
achieve this, within the broadest political/judicial concept of
fiscal equality, given the profound harms of racial and
social segregation to opportunity in this society. This is not
to say that money does not help poor school districts or
students. It clearly can. But racial and social integration,
while far more difficult to achieve, are fundamentally more
likely to make an opportunity difference for children.
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